ABSTRACT Recent advancement in digital and communication technologies has brought privacy aspects to the forefront. Although e-health has many advantages and it facilitates the patients and health service providers significantly, the possibility of privacy breaches can allow sensitive health care information to move into the wrong hands. Designing robust privacy preserving policies to strengthen the trust of patients in electronic health records is imperative for its wide spread acceptance and success. In this paper, we propose, a framework to solve the privacy problem in a heterogeneous network of many clinical institutions while preserving data utility and patients' privacy. The contributions of this paper include: (1) scalable privacy-enabled architecture supporting re-identification of patient identity, and (2) context-aware privacy-preserving scheme supporting named and anonymous linked access to medical data stored at one or more health service providers. Moreover, to demonstrate the correctness of proposed privacy-aware scheme, we performed formal modeling and verification using high-level Petri nets and Z3 Solver.
I. INTRODUCTION
Health care involves expensive and challenging services that prominently affect the quality of patients' life and economies. Electronic healthcare (e-Health) is an encouraging technology, which appeals the devotions of many industries and academia. E-health is the use of information and communication technologies to acquire, transfer or store healthcare related information and provide services used by HCP and consumers. E-Health promises not only to facilitate patients but also doctors, researchers, health organizations, policy makers, pharmaceutical companies etc., by providing them information whenever and where ever required. A central aspect of e-health is the Electronic Health Record (EHR), which consist of an object or a set of objects. It can be created, and consulted by authorized users (such as doctors, policy makers, clinicians, researchers etc.) across more than one Health Care Organizations (HCOs). Over time, an EHR may accumulate information including identification information, laboratory results, medication history, diagnoses, immunization status, digital renderings of medical images, dietary habits, sexual preference, genetic information, and psychological profiles. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Committee Draft Technical Recommendation 20514, ISO defined EHR broadly as ''a repository of information regarding the health status of a subject of care in a computer process able form, stored and transmitted securely and accessible by multiple authorized users''. E-Health technologies enable Remote Patient Monitoring (RPM); better dissemination of information to patients; improved access to health advice; access to remote consultations; telemedicine and quicker access to emergency services; patient empowerment for self-care and health decision making; improve quality and safety of care; and efficiency and efficacy of care processes.
To enable correct diagnosis of disease, determination of treatment, and to prevent any adverse drug interactions, patients are required to share their health information with their physicians. Such medical information is also beneficial for the common betterment of public health management, hospital accreditation and medical research community.
Privacy is one of the major requirement that concern patients in E-health [1] . Privacy of health information is defined as ''the mechanism to control the disclosure of personal health information''. According to a survey conducted in 1999, measuring patient attitudes toward health privacy, three out of four people reported that they had significant concerns about the privacy of their records [2] . EHRs may contain private and sensitive personal details, such as illnesses that might carry social humiliation, employment, lifestyle, diseases, disabilities, medication and healthcare history, etc. Lack of EHRs privacy may leads to loss of jobs, discrimination, identity theft, cancellation of insurance of a member and social embarrassment.
Governments in many countries have recognized the importance of protecting citizen's privacy. The European Union (EU) Directive [3] on the protection of patients with respect to processing and exchange of their personal data, has led to data protection laws in all European countries, such as the UK [4] . The EU data protection directive (95/46/EC) has been in place since 1995 and hopefully will be replaced by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2017 [5] . Additionally, in the EU many domestic acts (e.g., the Austrian Data Protection Act [6] ) dictate strict regulations on processing of personal data. The U.S. Health and Human Services (HHS) issued the privacy rule [7] to implement the requirement of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [8] . The Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (PCEHR Act) in Australia, allows the patient to control their own e-health record, including the ability to restrict which Health Service Provider (HSP) can access their EHR and what information can be stored in EHR [9] , [10] . In a survey conducted in Australia, 67 percent of respondents indicated they would be willing to allow their de-identified health records to be used for medical research purposes, but 81 percent wanted to be asked first before sharing information [11] . De-identification [12] of patient EHR refers to the process in which tuple attributes that identify the patient (termed as identifiers) are removed from the medical records. The EC Data Protection Directive states that data is personal only if an individual is identified directly or indirectly by someone. When the individual is not identified or identifiable the EC Data Protection Directive does not apply to data. In U.S. HIPAA [13] specifies categories of protected health information (PHI) (including names, geographic locations, social security numbers, telephone, fax numbers and medical record numbers, among others) that must be removed from EHR to avoid patient identification. However, PHI information can be released to researchers only in some situations including where allowed by patients, after obtaining permission from the privacy board or internal advisory board [13] - [16] . The timely and effective completion of researches is greatly hampered by complex consent and privacy protection forms, that result in time and cost increasing procedures [17] . According to a webbased survey of epidemiologists conducted in 2007, 68% of researchers reported that HIPAA made medical research very challenging, and about 39% believed HIPAA has led to an increase in research cost, and about 51% believed HIPAA enforcement has resulted in inadvertent delays in research [18] .
Commonly used de-identification techniques include: (i) de-personalization [50] , (ii) anonymization [29] , [30] , and (iii) pseudonymization [22] , [31] . De-personalization involves removing as much direct and indirect identifiers from the patient's medical records as required to achieve privacy, therefore this technique does not support the link ability requirement. Anonymization is a privacy preserving technique that is used to ensure that a combination of attributes within the patient's medical records-will not result in identification of the patient to which the records belong. Suppression, generalization and slicing are popular anonymization techniques [29] , [30] . Most of the existing anonymization schemes does not satisfy the requirement of link ability of the patient medical records to the identification information [51] , [52] . In pseudonymization the patient identification data is replaced with an identifier. Pseudonymization [19] , [31] is an approach that provides a form of traceable anonymity (linking identification data with an identifier) and the association can only be accomplished under specified and controlled circumstances.
Sometimes, for researchers, policy makers, and pharmacist knowing the personal details of the patient might not be important but what interests them is the linked inter-HSP medical records (patient's medical history stored in more than on HSPs). Thus, in such context the use of EHR can be allowed after de-identification. However, simply providing de-identified EHR access might not be sufficient in all medical scenarios. In clinical research the research subject might be re-contacted under certain circumstances. Other examples include: the provisioning of follow-up data, patient suffering from a chronic disease, doctor might want to check patient history before suggesting him/her any medicine or treatment. In some scenarios even the re-identification of a patient is required from de-identified medical records. For example, when clinically relevant information that can have a direct impact on patient treatment arises or in emergency scenarios. It's not just linking of personal identification information and medical records, but also the interlinking of medical data stored in different hospitals of the same patient, which requires to identify that the medical records belongs to the same patient. Therefore, a privacy preserving framework should support re-identification of a patient from the deidentified data and the access should be allowed to authorized users only.
The World Health Organization (WHO) introduced the concept of ''proportional or reasonable anonymity'' [19] . The work emphasizes that proportional or reasonable anonymity exists when no reasonable ways of identification exist that can identify the specific individual. To avoid delay in researches in some scenarios (for example, measuring the adverse effects of a drug) it would be beneficial to provide the researchers with the de-identified linked medical records of the limited number of patients in a specific medical context (i.e., same class of medical disease such as diseases of the nervous system, or diseases of the eye and adnexa). For such authorization, the Health Service Provider (HSP) must be held responsible for taking authorization from the patient at the time of registration. The researcher must sign a Data Use Agreement with the HSP outlining the specific permitted uses and disclosures by the researcher, that will prevent unauthorized use of the information.
The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) guidelines propose that ''researchers should be required not to attempt to re-identify participants (7.D)'' as one of the policy option [20] . Furthermore, the work stresses on the need to provide researchers with data or information that is pseudonymised such that the individual cannot be identified unless strictly necessary. The European Medicines Agency (EMEA) [21] proposes that Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) who generate pseudonyms or store the identifiers should be ''an external entity, such as governmental agency, legal counsel, or other qualified third party not involved with the research''. In some countries the entity who holds the pseudonyms and identifiers are important in term of law. According to UK Data Protection Act 1998, as long as the researchers as data controllers hold the pseudonymised (coded) data and are unable to re-identify the patients, they do not fall under the act [56] .
The aim of this paper is to present privacy-preserving architecture based on reversible pseudonymization technique.
To summarize, the contributions of our work include: 1) A scalable privacy-enabled architecture that supports patient re-identification from de-identified data using reversible pseudonymization technique. Such privacy preserving frame work can be used to provide authorization to users with different needs such as researchers, medical practionner etc. 2) A privacy-preserving scheme is presented that supports anonymous linked inter-HSPs access (medical history of patient's stored in multiple HSPs) and intra-HSP access (medical history of patient's stored in single HSP) related to specific class of disease (contextaware). 3) Comparison of proposed scheme with existing work supporting anonymous linked access using reversible pseudonymization technique. 4) Moreover, to demonstrate the correctness of proposed privacy preserving scheme, we performed formal modeling and verification using High Level Petri Nets (HLPN) and Z3 Solver. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the related work; Section III presents the overview of the scheme and Section IV presents the attacker model; Section V presents the detailed security analysis of the presented architecture. Section VI presents the comparison with existing work supporting anonymized linked access using reversible pseudonymization technique. Section VII presents the formal verification of the anonymity scheme, and Section VIII, discusses the future work and concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A widely used approach towards enforcing privacy is the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) method [28] . One of the main advantages of RBAC is the flexibility it provides. The biggest drawback of this approach is that the patient has to trust a third party for storing the data. If the Trusted Third Party (TTP) server is compromised the patient data along with identification may be revealed.
The work [23] , [24] reviews existing literature using different cryptographic approaches to enforce privacy. In e-health system, EHR size tends to be large such as storing a patient X-ray require about 6MB of data [39] , computer tomography scan about hundreds of MB [40] . Encryption/decryption are computationally intensive and time taking operations and its application on such a large amount of data can be too expensive in terms of computation [41] . Another approach used for enhancing privacy of EHR system is pseudonymization. Pseudonymization technique replaces the patient identification data by a identifier (pseudonym). There are two broad categories of pseudonyms: (i) ir-reversible (one-way) pseudonyms, and (ii) reversible pseudonyms. Irreversible pseudonyms are pseudonyms that cannot be reversed back to obtain the identity of the owner's (i.e., patients). Reversible pseudonymization, allows for re-identification of owner. The pseudonym can be associated with identification under controlled circumstances. Two reversible pseudonymization approaches allow identification of owner: (i) mapping table, and (ii) mapping function. The mapping table approach is easy to implement but is associated with security and performance threats. They are prone to disclosure attacks. The security of the entire system will be compromised in case this table is compromised. In addition, the increase in the size of the mapping table will ultimately result in increase in query response time. The mapping function approach focuses on approaches relying on cryptographic mechanisms [42] . Fig. 1 presents the taxonomy of the existing work on privacy-preserving schemes in e-health using pseudonymiza-FIGURE 1. Privacy-preserving schemes for e-health using pseudonymization technique. tion technique. Table 1 presents comparison of the existing privacy-preserving schemes using pseudonymization techniques based on important features.
A. Ir-REVERSIBLE PSEUDONYM GENERATION SOLUTION
Alhaqabani and Fidge [43] , presented privacy preserving scheme that uses one-way (ir-reversible) pseudonymization technique. The proposed system provides inter-HSP access. Each patient is assigned a unique primary identity. The identity linkage at the central EHR system generates a unique local identity upon receiving request from the user for linkage to a specific HSP. Patient is assigned a unique local pseudonym for each HSP. HSP and central EHR management system uses PKI for identity management. The generated local pseudonym is stored at the central EHR system for linking patient local identity to the primary identity and is provided to the specific HSP. The HSP e-health system after receiving the request replaces the patient local identity with the local pseudonym, signs it digitally with HSP PKI, and forward the request to the central EHR management system. If the access policy allows, the system replaces the primary identity of a patient with the corresponding local pseudonym at the destination, digitally signs the request and forwards it to destination HSP.
Benzschawel and Da Silveira [44] , proposed privacy preserving scheme using one-way (ir-reversible) pseudonymization. The personal identification data is separated from the medical document. The medical document is encrypted with a unique symmetric key, where the separation of person identification data is not possible (i.e., X-Ray image). All the users are allocated primary ID by central EHR system. The TTP generates pseudonym for a patient based on personal identifying data and the primary ID. Which it provides to the central EHR system upon request. Central EHR system establishes the mapping between the pseudonym and medical data and stores the pseudonym in the metadata of the document. When an authorized user requests for a medical record, the symmetric key of the document is sent to TTP for encryption with the public key of the requester. After encryption, the user is provided with both encrypted document and the encrypted key.
Slamanig and Stingl [45] proposed formal model of an eHealth portal. To avoid disclosure of the complete medical data of a person, the system supports creating sub-identities of a person. The root pseudonym of the patient is divided into sub-pseudonyms, using a random number generator. A user can hide sensitive data (for example which directly identifies a patient) under one sub-identity, and the data for which he/she allows access in the other sub-identity. The work assumes existence of e-health portal for storing user, document, and a mapping Au and Croll [46] proposed framework for privacypreserving identity management using encryption and oneway pseudonymization. In this work, it is assumed that there are four main entities of the system: (i) health support consumer (HSC), (ii) HSP, (iii) TTP, and (iii) external referees (like banks, government agencies etc.,) that provide referrals to their clients upon requests. In this work, it is assumed that each registered entity is assigned a public key (identity) certificate. Local TTP is responsible for identity management of the local users. It generates public and private key pair for each entity based on the random key generator algorithm. The key pair serves as pseudonymous identifier. The public key is used in activities like medical consultations, where as private key is used for authentication and digital signing. The HSC is provided with the generated public and private key pair along with the key binding certificate.
Noumeir et al. [53] proposed a privacy-preserving architecture using reversible pseudonymization. The authors focused on using mapping function to provide reversibility. The authors believe that mapping function is hard to be reversed by unauthorized persons, therefore, supporting more security. The proposed scheme uses the Data Encryption Standard (DES) encryption algorithm to generate the pseudonym from the patient ID. To ensure the uniqueness of the patient identification while collecting data from multiple HSPs, the work requires issuance of pseudonyms to the HSPs that should be used in conjunction with patient pseudonyms. The authors suggested that the pseudonymization service should be performed by a TTP, implementing the Audit Trail and Node Authentication Profile (ATNA) [54] for security purposes.
Lo Iacono [55] focused on providing privacy in multicentric studies, where data from medical study centers is linked together. The scheme supports anonymized access to data using irreversible pseudonymization technique. In this work concept of multi-centric universal pseudonymization is introduced, same pseudonym will be generated from the patient's identification information, regardless of the data origin (study center) from which the patient data is collected. The assumption is all the study centers will have unique patient's personal identification information. One-way hash functions and asymmetric cipher are applied to generate local pseudonym for a patient at the study center. The global pseudonym is generated based on computed local pseudonym.
Pommerening and Reng [57] focuses on preserving patient privacy against third party users such as medical researchers. They presented a privacy preserving scheme using one-way pseudonymization scheme. HSP generates the unique local identity of the user. To provide data to the third party user, the HSP first encrypt the medical data using the public key of the third party user. After replacing the patient real identity with the local identity, the encrypted medical data along with the unique local identity is sent to the TTP. The local identity is hashed and encrypted to generate a unique pseudonym. The generated pseudonym for the patient along with the medical data is transmitted to the third party user.
B. REVERSIBLE PSEUDONYM GENERATION SOLUTIONS
Elger et al. [56] presents an overview of secondary data use and its implementation in distributed @neurIST research project from several aspects including technical, practical, legal, and ethical aspects. In this work benefits and challenges of reversible pseudonymization are discussed.
Zhang et al. [49] presented Linkable Identity Privacy Algorithm (LIPA) for health grid. The presented scheme allows linkable data access by using reversible pseudonymization. The system uses a separate identifier termed as GlobalID to link health records of the same patient located at different HSPs. The patient records generated by multiple HSPs are stored in a single centralized repository. TTP encode patient's identifying information into pseudonym.
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Riedl et al., proposed a layered-architecture for improving the privacy of patients information in e-health applications [48] . Each layer consists of one or more encrypted keys or hidden relations. The outer layer is the authentication layer, the middle layer is user permission layer and the innermost layer contains the concealed data. This system makes use of both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography along with one-way hash functions to generate pseudonyms to anonymize medical data and to link patient anonymized medical data. Irreversible pseudonym is used for anonymization and reversible pseudonyms are used for linking medical data. For authentication, user is given a smart card having his outer public key secured with a pin. Each user of the system is allocated a personal identifier (i.e., ID) and a dataset in the identification database. To allow the patient to access data, his/her inner private key is decrypted with the outer public key stored in smart card. The patient inner-private key is then used to decrypt the inner-symmetric key. Innersymmetric key can then be used for decrypting the concealed data in the inner most layers. One or more pseudonyms are associated with medical data set. Keywords are defined in order to build relation between the stored medical data and the pseudonyms. The work also presented scheme to recover from lost smart card.
Addas et al., introduced a three level of identity privacy preservation technique [25] - [27] . The system allows for named or anonymous linked, non-linked access to interHSPs and intra-HSP records. In the proposed scheme, a hierarchy of three-level pseudonyms is designed. Level-1 pseudonym purpose is to hide the patient identity; it is generated by TTP using symmetric cipher Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The Level-2 pseudonyms are generated to have a unique pseudonym attached to every object of a patient within a managing HSP (using symmetric cipher AES standard). Level-3 pseudonyms are distributed to users as part of their access credentials (part of their attribute certificate).
III. ENHANCED PRIVACY PRESERVING SCHEME OVERVIEW
In countries like UK, to avail medical facility each citizen is required to get registered with National Health Authority (NHA) and get National Health Service (NHS) number. NHA is responsible for de-identification, generating a unique identifier to hide the identity of a citizen. Authorized users can obtain the identification information of the patient, by providing NHS number. In our scheme, the NHA is termed as Health Care Authority (HCA). Apart from the citizens, the HCOs needs to register with the HCA.
Identity privacy can be achieved through the use of a pseudonym. One solution is to re-encode the NHS number of patient into a pseudonym. Such encoding and decoding can be performed as required by a trusted third party (such as the HCA trust). But the aim of this paper to address the following requirements: (i) linking multiple de-identified medical records of the same patient without identifying the patient, (ii) re-identifying a patient under specific controlled circumstances, (iii) allowing access to medical history (link de-identified objects) of random group of patients suffering from specific disease class, from single HSP (intra-HSP) or multiple HSP's (inter-HSPs), without allowing to link the medical objects to patient's identity nor to learn about the identity of the patient. In our presented scheme, to provide anonymity, Trusted Third Party (TTP) generates a unique pseudonym termed as Global Identifier (GID i ) based on NHS number of patient i. The GID i can be reversed to generate unique NHS number, which can be used to request HCA for the identification information. Therefore, GID i supports linkability to the identification information of the patient i. The problem is if the same GID i is used for storing and indexing medical records of patient i in multiple Health Care Organizations (HCOs), then an internal attacker who somehow grabbed a GID i , can obtain the multiple records of a patient i more easily, stored in multiple HCOs. To prevent such vulnerability, as depicted in Fig. 2 , unique Local Identifier (LID ij ) is generated for each patient i by the HCO j based on his/her GID i . In our scheme, LID ij hide the linkage between the medical records of the patient stored in multiple HCOs. A cryptographic algorithm is presented to establish the mapping between the multiple local identities of patient i (each uniquely generated for a specific HCO) and GID i of a patient. The GID i allows linking patient i medical records stored in multiple HCOs, to generate medical history. The presented scheme supports a scenario, where if a patient changes a care provider, his/her medical records can still be linked as long as the the care provider is registered with the HCA without compromising the patient's identity.
Although, an attacker with anonymous linked access to patient EHR might judge the patient based on certain attributes values (certain characteristics the patient might have) present in the medical records. Using data mining techniques, with some related real-world information (collected through external sources) and anonymized linked medical records of patients (in all medical categories), one can identify the patient. Consider the following example scenario. Suppose a group of people had an eye operation on the same day. Few member belongs to the same group had a treatment for any kidney problem just before the eye operation. One patient belongs to those few members had just consulted his/her doctor about his/her routine check-up. Therefore, our system supports minimum exposure to information, the authorized users will be allowed to access anonymous linked records of patients suffering from the specific class of disease. It is therefore required that the medical objects (records) of the patients should be stored with some information representing the class of the disease for which those objects were generated and stored.
Different classification systems exist that classifies diseases. A number of coding systems are implemented and used that codes the disease sign and symptoms such as International Classification of Primary Care (ICPC), SNOMED, and ICD-10. The International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th Revision (ICD-10) is a medical classification list by the World Health Organization (WHO). The basic structure of the ICD-10 code is the following: Characters 1-3 (the category of disease); 4 (etiology of disease); 5 (body part affected); 6 (severity of illness); and 7 (placeholder for extension of the code to increase specificity). For example, G00-G99 refers to the category of the diseases of the nervous system and H00-H59 refers to the category of the diseases of the eye and adnexa. H00.0 refers to Hordeloum and H00.1 refers to Chalazion eye disease [32] . ICD-10 code is implemented in most of countries such as UK, US etc. [32] . In our scheme, all the HCOs are required to use the ICD-10 coding scheme to represent the disease context. In our work, context is termed as Medical Disease Classification Identity (MDCID). MDCID is comprised of first five characters of ICD-10. Basic structure of MDCID is as follows:
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A. GENERATION AND REVERSAL OF GLOBAL IDENTITY (GID)
This phase provides anonymity to the patient as well as medical researcher. Each patient has a unique NHS_NO i . GID i for each patient i, is generated in two steps: (i) Patient's private key (P T i ) is generated by encrypting NHS_NO i of a patient i by using the secret key (SecK T TTP ) of the TTP (We have used Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) for this purpose [33] [34]), (ii) TTP digitally sign the P T i using his/her private key. GID i is generated by encrypting P T i by using the private of TTP (PR T TTP ). We used Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman (RSA) algorithm [34] for above encryption. The algorithm is presented in Fig. 3 . GID i Reversibility For getting the personal identification number NHS_NO i, the GID i decryption involves two steps: (i) Using the public key of the TTP the GID i will be decrypted to P T i (depicted in Equation 1), and later (ii) P T i ciphertext will be decrypted into NHS_NO i ||Nonce i (depicted in Equation 2), using SecK T TTP .
B. GENERATION AND REVERSAL OF ANONYMOUS LINKABLE PSEUDONYM (LOCAL IDENTITY (LID))
LID ij is generated by each HSP for each patient i by using patient's GID i . To enforce security, the symmetric key of the HSP j (i.e., SK HSP j ) is stored in the encrypted form (E-SK HSP j ) using the secret key of the HSP j (i.e., SecK HSP j ). HSP generates LID ij by encrypting hash code of HID j (h(HID j )), and GID i using HSP's symmetric key (SK HSP j ), depicted in Fig. 4 . We used Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm for above encryption/ decryption [33] . AES is more secure, and reliable than any block cipher. Hospital ID (HID j ) is generated for each hospital by the NHA. The HID j is generated based on the name of the hospital and its location by the NHA at the time of hospital registration with NHA. h(HID j ) generates hash code of the HID j using SHA-3 algorithm [35] . 
C. GENERATION AND REVERSAL OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER (OID)
The doctor/administrator, who wants to upload a medical record of a patient in a specific medical domain, will be required to include the medical disease classification identity using MDCID d . Each patient will have unique pseudonym for every medical object (medical record) in the HSP i.e., OID ijo (Where i refers to patient, j refers to hospital and o refers to object ID), depicted in Equation 8 . Date and time refers to the date on which the medical examination of the patient took place due to which the object is generated or at which it is entered. Date and time is stored in the form of an identifier in order to provide more privacy to the patient's record. The function uniqueID (date, time) generates a unique 15-digit number representing recent date and time. Additive homomorphic encryption (⊕) is used to encrypt LID ij and E-SK HSP j . Homomorphic encryption [36] allows performing certain operations over encrypted data, generated encrypted result matches the results of operations on the plain data. For example, it could add two encrypted values without decrypting them. The records are indexed using OID ijo. Each time when a new OID ijo 1 is generated for the object o 1 of the patient i in HCO j, the prefix of this OID ijo 1 will be similar to all generated object identifiers for the patient i (OID ijo 2 , OID ijo 3 . . . OID ijo r ) in HCO j with similar MDCID d . This is achieved using the additive homomorphic operation (in Fig. 5 ). Indexing the records using OID ijo facilitate efficient searching not only the records of a patient i in HCO j, but also all the records of a patient i in HCO j with similar MDCID d . This will also facilitate providing intra-HSP access to multiple records of a patient. Each patient LID ij is encrypted with the symmetric key of the HSP (PR_LID HSP ) termed as E-LID ij which is then encrypted with the public key of the patient stored on the smart card protected by pin and provided to the service consumer.
After proper authentication and authorization (using identity and attribute certificates), the concerned medical practionner provides the patient medical record, context (i.e., MDCID d ), E-LID ij , date, time,and practionner ID (E-LID pj ) to the system. The system decrypts E-LID ij to generate LID ij . After that OID ijo is generated as specified in Fig. 5 to store medical record.
E. GENERATION OF ACCESS PSEUDONYMS
The proposed framework allows different authorized users to access patient's distributed electronic medical records at different levels including: (i) Context-aware anonymous linked Intra-HSPs access to a specific single patient (L1), (ii) Context-aware anonymous linked Inter-HSPs access to a single patient (L2), (iii) Context-aware anonymous linked Intra-HSP access to a random group of multi-patients (L3), (iv) Context-aware anonymous linked inter-HSPs access to a random group of multi-patients (L4), (v) Context-aware named linked Intra-HSP access to a single patient (L5), (vi) Context-aware named linked Inter-HSPs access to a single patient (L6). Researchers can be assigned group memberships for L3 and L4 access, where as the medical practionner can be assigned group memberships for L1, L2, L5 and L6. This paper focuses more on providing access to the researchers.
Context-aware Anonymous linked Intra-HSP access to a specific single patient records by Medical Practionner
After proper authentication and authorization (using certificates), the medical practitioner provides the information (such as MDCID d , encrypted LID ij of a patient (E-LID ij ), encrypted LID pj (E − LID pj ) of the medical practitioner) to access a specific set of medical records of a single patient in single HSP. The pseudonym P_IntraD HSP p (depicted in Equation 4) is generated by using symmetric key PR_LID HSP of HSP. This phase provides anonymous linkable access of EHRs within specific context to the medical practitioner p.
Generation and Reversal of Pseudonym for Medical Researcher Authorization
This phase provides anonymous linkable access of EHRs within specific medical context to medical researcher. The proposed scheme provides two types of accesses to the medical researchers after proper authentication and if access policies allows. Once the researcher is properly authenticated and authorized then the central EHR management system request the TTP to generate an ''L3'' or ''L4'' pseudonym for the researcher based on his/her requirement. These pseudonyms are distributed to researchers as part of their access credentials.
Context-aware Anonymous linked Intra-HSP access to a group of patients (L3)
For intra-HSP access the researcher provide information for accessing specific set of medical records such as MDCID d , specific hospital, and the number of patients whose linked medical records are required. After checking the access control policies, P_IntraR TTP k is generated by the TTP for researcher k . The pseudonym P_IntraR TTP k is generated by using the specific HSP public key (depicted in Fig.  6 ). Each HSP public key is certified by TTP for proving ownership of the public key and assigning attributes for the entity.
L3 Access Pseudonym Reversibility
The generated P_IntraR TTP k can be reversed to get required attributes as depicted in Equation 5 .
Decryption(PR
T HSP , P_IntraR TTP k ) = (Nonce k ||h(GID k , Nonce k )||''L3 ||GID k ||No.ofpatients||MDCID d ) (5)
Context-aware Anonymous linked Inter-HSPs access to a group of patients
There is a mutual trust between the TTP and any of the HSP. A secret is shared between them so that the authenticity of the messages can be assured. P_InterR TTP k is generated by the TTP for each medical researcher k to grant him/her access right L4. Number of patients specifies the number of patients required for conducting research. 
L4Access Pseudonym Reversibility
The generated P_InterR TTP k can be decrypted using PR T TTP to get required attributes as depicted in Equation 6 .
F. ACCESS AND AUTHORIZATION
Access is controlled by authentication and authorization. In distributed domain access certificate based credential approach can be used as being used in [37] , [38] . For access the user is required to provide evidence using identity and attribute credentials. Identity credentials are used for authentication, where as attribute credentials are used for authorization. All users who wants to access patient's medical records needs to authenticate themselves using identity certificate. In our scheme the identity certificate is generated by Certification Authority (CA) at TTP, where as attribute certificate can be generated by HSP or TTP. It is issued and signed by the certification authority, which can later be verified by TTP [43] . Identity certificate contains the information such as certificate serial number, group membership, issuer's identity, user (researcher, medical practionner) identity, certificate validity period, time stamp and issuer signature. Group membership refers to group they are member of. Attribute certificate contains certificate holder access information [44] . Attribute authority manages the access by storing the access control policies in the access policy file. To perform anonymous inter-HSPs linkable access or anonymous intra-HSP linkable access the researcher is required to provide both identity credential and attribute credential. Researcher from HSP H 1 , for inter-HSPs access, upon proper authentication and confirming authorization, request the request management component (RMC) at TTP. RMC will confirm from its database which hospital works in the required context based on MDCID d specified in the pseudonym. The RMC then request to one of the HSP i.e., H 2 for the specified number of patients GIDs in context MDCID d . The HSP 2 after receiving the request from TTP will perform the proper authentication and authorization. It will then send the required m GID's of m patients along with their data to the TTP through secured channel. The RMC at TTP then request the other HSP's one by one working in the same contexts confirming whether they have the records of any of the patients provided by H 2 (among m GID's received from H 1 ) in the context MDCID d . The other HSP's then respond to the TTP with the records and corresponding GIDs, if they have. The TTP RMC will gather the records from all HSPs VOLUME 5, 2017 and after hiding GID will provide it to H 1 for access by researcher.
IV. ATTACKER MODEL
In the proposed approach, the main objective of an attacker is to get information about the medical history of a particular patient. For example, an insurance company wants to access the sensitive medical details of the patient (medical information from the psychiatric hospital or dentistry hospital etc.) to cancel his/her medical insurance. An attacker can be either internal or external to the e-health system. An internal attacker can either be authorized or unauthorized entities of the e-health system. For example, administrator, internal health personnel may breach into system out of curiosity, for profit, or taking revenge from patient or doctor. We assume all the external attackers outside the e-health system are unauthenticated and unauthorized entities to the e-health system.
An attacker may try to break into the system, to collect information about patient. In order to do so, an attacker has several options.
• An attacker who somehow grabbed patient identification ID (such as NHS number) from patients, or concerned authority/relatives tries to use that ID to request HSP or TTP for the medical records of that particular patient.
• An attacker who somehow found the LID ij and being an internal attacker (having access to database) tries to locate and link the medical records of a particular patient.
• An attacker who somehow found the identity information of particular patient in the specific HSP will try to gather information about that patient from all HSP's.
• An attacker as an authorized user access the anonymous linked or unlinked inter-HSPs or intra-HSP records and apply data mining techniques to identify the patient he/she is looking for. The following assumptions hold for the proposed system. All entities (HCA, TTP, HSP) that are authenticated and authorized by the system are assumed trustworthy in regard to not sharing patient information with unauthorized entities. The internal malicious entities that can authenticate themselves or authorize by the system to use services can attack the system. Security-enhancing functionalities are robust and well deployed. Secret keys of the entities are stored physically secure. Secure communication channel is used for communication. Patient's records have already been de-identified. The medical records are stored in distributed manner in different hospitals. The underlying cryptographic algorithms used in symmetric and asymmetric key ciphers are secure. All HSPs completely trust the TTP who issues pseudonym to each user. HCA trust TTP.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, a security analysis of proposed scheme corresponding to the previously described attacker model is presented.
A. TTP TRIES TO COMPROMISE USER'S PRIVACY
Even though TTP is supposed to be a trustworthy, it might want to use the stored information in its own benefit. In the proposed scheme, the TTP only stores information related to registered users. It does not store any kind of mapping information about the GID i and NHS i nor any kind of personal identification information.
B. PSEUDONYM FORGERY
If even the malicious user knows the GID i of the patient, he/she still needs to access the keys and pseudo function to convert it to NHS number at TTP. Moreover, in case if the malicious user gets successful in conversion, he/she still cannot obtain patient personal identification information or grab his/her medical records. To access personal information, he/she must be authorized by HCA. Further, all medical records of a patient are stored in distributed manner in HSPs. If the user gets hold of the patient GID i , he/she cannot still access the medical records from any hospital. Each hospital assigns a unique pseudonym to each patient and unique pseudonym to each of its medical record.
C. HSP TRIES TO COMPROMISE USER'S PRIVACY
In order to properly validate the proposed framework, the case where a malicious HSP is willing to get further private information must be analyzed. Let us assume that an adversary is controlling the HSP. In this case, there is a need to analyze that the HSP does not learn anything. Hence, it should not be able to discover neither the real identifier of a patient i, nor the mapping between the anonymous identity of the patient i in the HSP (i.e., LID ij ) and his/her record IDs (i.e., OID ijo ), nor the information about the patient i identity in other HSPs.
The real identity of the users is not released to the HSP (i.e., NHS number) at any time. If the malicious user came to know about the GID i of the patient, he will not be able to grab his LID ij. If he knows the encrypted LID ij (ELID ij ), the internal attacker needs to convert it to LID ij. Even if he knows LID ij and also have hacked the database then he/she must not be able to filter records of the LID ij . In our work, the adversary cannot correlate the LID ij of the patient to his/her record IDs (i.e., OID ijo ). Each medical record of the patient is assigned a unique encrypted OID ijo m . Till the time the adversary get access to the secret keys and the information about the underlying encryption algorithm, they cannot decrypt OID ijo m to get information about LID ij . The user must know the secret keys and the underlying algorithm to convert LID ij to GID i .
D. GUESSING ATTACKS AGAINST SECRET KEYS (BRUTE FORCE ATTACK)
The patient pseudonyms (GID i , LID ij , and OID ijo ) are not generated by using random numbers or some other simpler methods, instead are generated using cryptographic schemes. Therefore, the probability to guess the right pseudonym by the adversary is low.
E. LINKABILITY THREAT
To enforce privacy, the presented framework makes use of the pseudonymization technique. By assuming that the user identification information is held with the HCA. The identifiers that directly or indirectly identify the patient are stored at HCA. Based on the user personal information NHS number is generated by HCA. For providing anonymity to the user this NHS number is encrypted and unique pseudonym is assigned to the user. An additional layer of confidentiality is provided, by enforcing each HSP j to hide the GID i by assigning unique LID ij , to each patient. This layer hides the interconnectivity of patient i records stored in different HSPs. If a patient only holds LID ij pseudonym, an attacker who gains access to the HSP j database could use data mining for identifying which medical data objects belongs to the patient i. Therefore, record identifiers are assigned to medical data objects to hide to which patient i in hospital j these belongs.
F. DATA MINING ATTACK
Whenever the user requires information about the patients for research purposes. He/she is only provided with anonymous linked medical records of the patient related to specific MDCID d . This is done to address the data mining attack, which is possible if the researcher is provided with the anonymous linked medical records of the patient available in all medical contexts. As described previously, providing anonymized linked medical records in all medical contexts to the user may result in patient identification.
G. CREDENTIAL THREAT
An attacker with valid access pseudonym cannot access patient information. Such threat is handled by using attribute and identity certificate.
VI. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING WORK SUPPORTING ANONYMIZED LINKED ACCESS
There exist work which by using reversible pseudonymization technique allows re-identification of patient and supports anonymous access [25] , [26] , [47] , [48] . Deng et al. [47] do support named access and anonymous unlinked access but do not support anonymous linkable access. In this section, the proposed scheme is compared with the schemes proposed by Addas et al. [25] , [26] and Riedl et al. [48] . The reason for comparing with work (Addas et al. [25] , [26] and Riedl et al. [48] ) is both uses reversible pseudonymization technique and do provide access to linked records. Table 2 provides the comparison with the existing work (Addas et al. [25] , [26] and Riedl et al. [48] ) in terms access allowed. Addas et al. [25] , [26] presented privacy-enable e-health architecture that support different user groups including medical researchers. Medical researchers are granted rights to access anonymous non-linked medical data of patients. The researchers are not authorized for having anonymous linked medical records or to link medical records to the identity of the owner of the records. This access is very limited because till the time they could not link the medical records of every single patient, they cannot diagnose a disease, suggest a treatment plan, or measure the effect of certain drug on the patient health. The authors claim that the proposed framework supports named/anonymous linked and non-linked access to EHRs. The work allows researcher to access anonymous unlinked medical records. This work also supports intra/inter-HSP access to single patient record in a HSP to the user. It supports HSP-controlled access where an HSP decides to whom to allow to access the records. This presented scheme supports distributed storage where the de-identified records of a patient are stored in a distributed manner (i.e. each health care organization stores the medical records locally). The proposed scheme does not support anonymous linked intra-HSP access. Riedl et al. [48] presented scheme where the de-identified records of a patient are stored in a centralized manner. This work supports patientcontrolled access where the patient decides to whom to provide access. The presented framework supports access to the patient records by relatives and doctors only. Patient relative can access complete medical history of a patient because the patient shares all his/her keys and other required information with the relative. In case of doctor, he/she can only access those de-identified medical records which they have stored for the particular patient or unless authorized by patient.
The proposed scheme supports anonymous linked intra-HSP/ Inter-HSPs access within a specific context to the EHRs. The work supports HSP-controlled access. The presented scheme supports distributed storage where the deidentified records of a patient are stored in a distributed manner. Table 3 provides the comparison with the existing work (Addas et al. [25] , [26] and Riedl et al. [48] ) in terms of cryptographic operations used to store records in m HSP's (or by m doctors in case of Riedl et al. [48] ). Table 3 , does not cover the additional cryptographic operations performed by the presented schemes to allow records access. In the Addas et al. method [25] , [26] , each HSP performs (m * O r ) hashing operations and 1+(m * O r ) symmetric operations to store records for each patient in m hospitals. In the Riedl et al. method [48] , each HSP performs m hashing operations, 1+ m * O r symmetric operations and 2 * (m * O r ) asymmetric operations to store records for each patient.
In the proposed scheme, TTP performs one symmetric and asymmetric operation to generate GID i . TTP uses the same keys (asymmetric and symmetric) to generate GID i for each patient. Each HSP performs two symmetric operations to generate LID ij for each patient. The same symmetric keys are used for all the patients within an HSP. Each HSP performs one additive homomorphic encryption operation to generate unique pseudonym for every object of a patient OID ijo m . HSP uses the same encrypted symmetric keys for all the patients within an HSP. [25] , [26] and Riedl et al. [48] ) in terms of number of keys required (to generate required pseudonyms) to store records. Table 4 provides the comparison with the existing work (Addas et al. [25] , [26] and Riedl et al. [48] ) in terms of number of keys used (for generating required pseudonyms) after de-identification to store medical records of a patient. Table 4 , does not cover the additional keys used by the presented schemes to support records access. The scheme presented in [25] and [26] is suffered from key management burden. In the proposed method, TTP uses same keys (symmetric and asymmetric) to generate patient's GID i whereas in Addas et al. method [25] , [26] , TTP first generate a unique symmetric key (TS i ) for each patient and then use that key for encrypting the patient ID (NHS number) to generate global (level-1) pseudonym. Moreover, it stores the generated key (TS i ) along with the patient ID (NHS number) for decryption (reversible pseudonymization using mapping table technique) to support named access. The work is using mapping table method for this purpose. Moreover, each HSP generates and stores a unique symmetric key for each patient to generate second level pseudonym (i.e., medical record ID). In contrast, in our work single symmetric key is used for all patients. The scheme proposed in our work does not require any kind of mapping table instead use the mapping function technique. Therefore, as compared to Addas et al. [25] , [26] , our technique is not suffered by access delay and threat to the mapping table attacks. To support reversibility, level-1 and level-2 pseudonyms are stored with each medical record [25] , [26] . An internal attacker with level-1 pseudonym can easily grab medical records of that particular patient. Furthermore, the performance of the schemes presented in [25] and [26] are not optimal in terms of computational and storage cost. The scheme presented in [25] and [26] might result in pseudonyms collision.
TABLE 5.
Comparison of proposed method with work (Addas et al. [25] , [26] and Riedl et al. [48] ) in terms of number of pseudonyms generated to store records (O r : No. of a Patient Medical Objects) in a HSP. Table 5 provides the comparison with the existing work (Addas et al. [25] , [26] and Riedl et al. [48] ) in terms of number of pseudonyms generated after de-identification to store medical records. Table 5 , does not cover the additional pseudonyms generated by the presented schemes to allow records access. In Addas et al. method [25] , [26] , one global pseudonym is used in order to hide patient's identification and the level-2 pseudonyms are generated to uniquely identify each record of a patient. The global pseudonym is used for linking all patient's distributed medical records. In this scheme the level-1 and level-2 pseudonyms are stored with each patient medical record. Moreover, one of the limitation of the work is the HSP can access or learn same patient medical records stored distributed without provid-ing additional privileges. In Riedl et al. method [48] , two pseudonyms are generated in order to store medical records of a patient. One root pseudonym is unique for every patient-HSP-anamnesis combination. Medical records are stored in the form of datasets. Each dataset is generated by HSP for a particular patient. Other local pseudonym is generated by the HSP, which is unique for each patient-HSP combination. This pseudonym is used to store the medical records of a particular patient. The number of pseudonyms will be increased to 1+m * O r in case of m HSP with each record, one or more tags are stored as keywords for latter searching of records. In the proposed method, each HSP generates a pseudonym LID ij , to identify the patient and OID ijom to identify each object of patient i in hospital j. Addas et al. method [25] , [26] , does not generate a unique pseudonym for a patient for each hospital, instead the global ID (level 1 pseudonym generated by TTP) is used for generation of pseudonym to identify each patient record.
VII. FORMAL VERIFICATION OF THE PRIVACY PRESERVING SCHEME
Verification process allows demonstrating the correctness of underlying model or system. For this purpose satisfaction of two parameters are required: (a) specification, and (b) properties (that determines the correctness) [58] . In this study, we use bounded model checking [59] , [60] technique to perform the verification of our proposed approach using Satisfiability Modulo Theories Library (SMT-Lib) and Z3 solver [65] . In the context of automated reasoning and formal verification, after Boolean Satisfiability Solvers (SAT), decision problems are successfully encoded and solved as Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) [61] . The SMT-Lib provides a common input platform for many solvers used for the verification of systems [61] , [62] . Abstract models can be used to represent behavioural specifications of a system. To perform bounded model checking SMT solvers can be used. A number of solvers are available that support SMT-Lib, such as Beaver, Boolector, CVC4, MathSAT5, Z3, and OpenSMT [61] , [62] , [65] .
A. HIGH-LEVEL PETRI NETS (HLPN)
HLPN can be used for mathematical and graphical modelling of several categories of systems, such as parallel and stochastic [63] , [64] . The HLPN allows to analyse the behaviour and structural properties of the system. In this work, we have used HLPN for the formal modeling of the proposed privacy technique. The HLPN is a set of 7-tuple, N = (P, T, F, ∅, R, L, M o ). P represents set of finite places; T represents set of finite transitions such that P and T are two distinct sets i.e. P∩T= ∅; F represents the flow relation such that from place to transition or transition to place i.e. F ⊆ (P×T) ∪ (T×P); ∅ represents the mapping function that maps places to data types it contain such that ∅: P → data types; R defines the set of rules that maps T to logical formulas such that R: T → formula; L represents the labels that are mapped on each flow in F such that L: F → label; and M0 represents the initial state/ marking where flow can be initiated such that M: P → tokens.
B. FORMAL MODELLING OF ALGORITHM 1, 2, 3
As discussed in Section III A, Algorithm 1 (Fig. 3) states the process of generating GID, Algorithm 2 (Fig. 4) states the process of generating LID and Algorithm 3 (Fig. 5) states the process of generating OID. In this section, we will generate the HLPN model of the said algorithms. The first step towards modeling is to identify places, data types, and respective mappings. The HLPN model of Algorithm 1, 2 and 3 is shown in Fig. 8 . Table 6 illustrates the places and the data types mapped on to the places. The Start transition is the input transition, allowing new tokens to enter in the HLPN model. The first step towards generating the GID is to generate the patient's private key by encrypting NHS_NO through SecK T TTP . The aforesaid functionality is performed by the AES Encryption transition of the HLPN model shown in Fig. 8 and the rules mapped on the transition are shown in (7). Once, the private key is created, the next step is that the TTP digitally sign the P T i with its PKI. Finally, the GID i is generated by encrypting P T i using the private key of TTP (PRI T TTP ), as shown in the rule mapped on to transition RSA Encryption in (8) .
The first step towards generating LID ij , the HSP uses the symmetric key cryptography to decrypt the symmetric key stored in the encrypted form E-SK HSP j using the secret key of the HCP j (i.e., SecK HSP j ) to enforce security, as depicted in (9) . The LID ij is generated by each Health service provider (HSP) j for each patient i by using patient's GID i . The HSP generates LID ij by encrypting hash code of HID j , andGID i using HSP's symmetric key (SK HSP j ). Local ID is generated for each user by the HSP, as shown in (10) .
∀gid ∈GID, ∀lid ∈LID (10) lid := LID(gid [1] , gid [2] , gid [3] , gid [4] )∧ LID = LID ∪ {gid [1] , gid [2] , gid [3] , gid [4] } Additive homomorphic encryption (⊕) is used to encrypt LID ij and E-SK HSP j (depicted in Equation 11 ). Date and time refers to the date on which the medical examination of the patient took place due to which the object is generated. All the medical records are indexed using the OID ijo (depicted in 12) 
C. ALGORITHM 4 PETRI-NET
Data types and mappings for algorithm 4 are shown in Table 7 . HLPN model is shown in Fig. 9 . The rules for the token creation can be stated as: 
D. ALGORITHM 5 PETRI-NET
The HLPN model of Algorithm 5 is shown in Fig. 10 . Table 8 illustrates the places and the data types mapped on to the places. For anonymous inter-HSPs access the pseudonym is generated in Equation 16 .
E. AUTOMATED VERIFICATION OF THE HLPN MODELS USING SMT-LIB
The automated verification of the HLPN models are performed by using SMT-Lib [61] and Z3 solver [65] . For verification using SMT, firstly, the petri net models are translated into SMT along with the specified properties. For checking whether the model satisfies the properties or not, Z3 solver is used. The first step towards the verification of the models is to unroll the model and the formula f that provides M and f , respectively. Moreover, for checking if M | f the parameters are passed to Z3 solver [57] , [64] . After performing verification, the solver will provide the results as satisfiable or un-satisfiable. In case of satisfiable, solver will generate a counter example, representing the violation of the property or formula. Otherwise, if the answer is unsatisfiable, then property f holds in M up to the bound k (in our case k is exec. time). Fig. 11 shows the execution time taken by the Z3 solver to verify the following four properties. Property 1: The GID is computed based on every patient's unique NHS. Therefore, it was important to verify if there exists any possibility where the aforesaid is not the case.
Property 2: Encrypting patient's private key using the private key of TTP will generate the GID for the patient. In property 2, we verified if the GID generated is correct and unique for each patient or not. 
Property 3:
The LID for patient is computed using the GID of that specific patient by encrypting the hash code of HID, and GID using HSP's symmetric keys. Therefore, we evaluate in Property 3 that either the generated LID is correct and unique for every patient or not.
Property 4: We verified if the object identifier OID ijom generated correctly or not.
VIII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
A privacy-aware scheme for efficient aggregation of context specific health data from multiple Health Service Providers (HSPs) is presented. The architecture supports providing authorization to users with different needs such as researchers, nurses, medical practitioners etc. The proposed scheme allows access to context-based anonymous linked inter-HSPs and intra-HSP medical records of group of patients for the research purposes. Moreover, through formal verification, the proposed privacy preserving protocol is verified.
There is a need to extend the authentication and authorization dimensions of the proposed framework. In e-health application there is a significant need to design privacy-preserving systems supporting usable and efficient data search strategies. Among others, reliability and privacy are the two important requirements that may impact the likability of medical records in different HSPs. The reason is, HSP may not satisfy the patient safety requirements and collecting data from such HSP, while aggregating data from all HSPs to create patient medical history will impact its trustworthiness. In e-health trust can be established based on the quality and reliability of HSP's, health professionals and data standards. Researchers have been pursuing the goal of achieving semantic interoperability of EHRs to allow sharing of medical data across healthcare organizations, but it has not been realized yet. There is a need for development of standardization frameworks that support data integrity and incorporate unified EHR schema and common semantics, to allow data sharing across health information exchanges. Digital devices from mobile phones to smart cards and Radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags are becoming increasingly ubiquitous. Rapid advancements in mobile technologies and applications resulted in new opportunities for the integration of mobile health into existing e-health services. This emphasizes on the need of designing lightweight privacy-preserving e-health protocols suitable for resource-constrained devices.
There are several open research issues in the field of privacy enabled e-health systems supporting heterogeneous environment including: (i) supporting heterogeneous environment, (ii) supporting different stakeholders by allowing different types of access and usage control, (iii) support for emergency conditions, (iv) trust and reputation modelling, (v) interoperability, (vi) data integrity, (vii) traceability of illegal distribution, and malicious users. HINA GHAFOOR received the M.S. degree in information security from COMSATS Institute of IT, Islamabad, Pakistan, in 2017. Her research interests include privacy and security protocols in wired and wireless networks.
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